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ANALYSIS
From Militia to Police: The Path of Russian law Enforcement Reforms
By Olga Semukhina, Milwaukee
Abstract
This article outlines the major events of the 2011 police reform in Russia and discusses the recent changes 
in the structure and function of the Ministry of Interior Affairs (MVD) implemented by Minister Vladimir 
Kolokol'tsev in 2012–2014. The analysis suggests that despite its limitations, the 2011 police reform reduced 
public tensions surrounding the issue of “bad and corrupt” police in Russia that were evident in 2009–2010.
Police Troubles
In 2011, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev conducted 
a new reform of the Russian police aimed at improv-
ing the public image of police officers and increasing 
their general efficiency. Following the breakdown of the 
Soviet Union in 1991, Russian society began to criticize 
its police force, whose problems were mostly the result 
of drastic underfunding and understaffing, deficiencies 
in turn exacerbated by pervasive corruption. In the past 
twenty years, the public–police relationship in Russia 
remained strained with a large number of citizens express-
ing distrust and dissatisfaction with law enforcement.
Longitudinal studies examining levels of trust and 
satisfaction with police in Russia indicate that at least 50 
percent of Russians do not trust the police in any given 
year; in some years the levels of public trust and satis-
faction plummeted to 30 percent. International studies, 
including the International Crime Victimization Sur-
vey (ICVS), New Europe Barometer (NEB), European 
Social Survey (ESS), Gallup World Poll, and World 
Value Survey (WVS) consistently rank Russia as one 
of the lowest countries in both public trust in and sat-
isfaction with police. The declared purpose of the 2011 
police reform in Russia was to restore public trust and 
improve citizens’ satisfaction by creating an efficient law 
enforcement agency that effectively serves and protects 
the Russian population.
The nature of the 2011 Police Reform in 
Russia
The 2011 police reform was initiated by Presidential 
Decree # 252 issued on January 3, 2011, and followed 
by the Federal law “On Police” #3-FZ issued on July 2, 
2011, and the Federal law “On Police Service” # 342-
FZ issued on November 30, 2011. These documents rec-
ommended an increase of police wages and benefits, a 
20 percent cut in personnel, a review of all police offi-
cers’ personnel files (“re-certification”) by internal affairs 
services, and centralization of all police funding so that 
the federal budget, rather than regional budgets, paid 
the police officers. The measures were meant to cleanse 
the Russian police of corruption and encourage more 
effective policing.
The ministry increased wages to at least $1,000 a 
month1 and the federal government began to pay sal-
aries in order to avoid delays from local budgets. Sub-
sequently, the overall funding for Russia’s police force 
(MVD) grew twofold between 2010 and 2012 to an 
estimated 25 billion dollars a year. Earlier analyses had 
blamed low wages for pervasive corruption among rank-
and-file police officers and their superiors.
The internal affairs service completed its review of 
every police officer’s file between March and August of 
2011 in order to identify corrupt or ill-suited officers. 
Based on available data, 90 percent (875,000) of exist-
ing officers and 94 percent of management personnel 
passed the review and retained their jobs.2
The MVD internal regulations were also reviewed to 
improve the officers’ assessment and promotion system. 
The preexisting system of police reporting and officer 
evaluation drew on pre-determined statistical indicators 
including the number of registered crimes and appre-
hended offenders and encouraged data manipulation 
and abuse of power. Police officers often failed to reg-
ister unsolvable crimes and forced innocent citizens to 
confess to crimes they did not commit in order to meet 
their performance targets. Reformers put in place a new 
assessment system that they claimed moved away from 
relying on statistical reports and thus sought to discour-
age data manipulation and abuse of power.3
The 2011 reform renamed the Russian police from 
“militia,” the term used during the Soviet period, to 
“politsia,” the Russian word for “police.” According to 
1 Interview with MVD Minister Nurgaliev published in Komso-
molskaya Pravda on 11.17.2011. Retrieved 7.7.2012 from <http://
kp.ru/daily/25789.4/2771871/>
2 Statistics provided by Komsomolskaya Pravda published on 
7.25.2011. Retrieved 7.7.2012 from <http://kp.ru/daily/25723.5/ 
2715985/> and interview with MVD Minister Kolokol'tsev pub-
lished in “Grani” on 6.25.2012. Retrieved 7.7.2012 from <http://
grani.ru/tags/police/m.198621.html>
3 Promulgated by MVD Decree #1310 issued on 12.26.2011. This 
decree was never published officially. Cited by in text provided 
at <http://etkovd.ucoz.ru/index/prikazy_mvd_rf_2011_god_ 
s_1001_i_dalee/0-55>
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then President Medvedev, the new name was more suited 
to describing the nature of Russian law enforcement.4
A variety of groups within Russian society held a vig-
orous discussion of the measures proposed by the 2011 
police reform. The draft laws were available online at 
websites that solicited comments and criticism from Rus-
sians. Citizens provided over 20,000 responses during 
the Internet public discussion related to the draft law 
“On Police” in 2010.5 Several prominent international 
and Russian NGOs, leading academic institutions, and 
government-authorized organizations conducted exami-
nations of the draft law and published their expert opin-
ions.6 Public opinion polls suggested that more than half 
of all Russians were aware of the reform and/or closely 
followed its development.7
During this discussion phase, experts on both the 
Russian police and media openly criticized the 2011 
police reform, arguing that it would have little impact 
on the performance of Russia’s law enforcement agency. 
Most critics agreed that the proposed measures were sim-
ply insufficient to promulgate a major change in such a 
troubled institution as the MVD. The most significant 
drawbacks of the 2011 reform included the lack of seri-
ous anti-corruption measures and a poorly conceived, 
rushed implementation.
Further Changes under Minister 
Kolokol'tsev, 2012–2014
In 2012, the newly appointed police minister, Vladi-
mir Kolokol'tsev, admitted that the 2011 police reform 
4 For example, see the news article at <http://newsru.com/russia/ 
06aug2010/medvedev_police.html>
5 For details on the public discussion, please see an archive at 
<http://zakonoproekt2012.ru/#law/police>
6 Among those organizations are Transparency International 
(the full report can be found at <http://www.transparency.org.
ru/reforma-politcii/zakliuchenie-po-zakonu-o-politcii>), Inde-
pendent Expert Council (full report can be found at <http://
www.neps.ru/node/1665>), Presidential Council on Human 
Rights (<www.president-sovet.ru/structure/group_corruption/
materials/zakon.doc>), The Institute of State and Law of the 
Russian Academy of Sciences (<http://www.igpran.ru/public/
articles/Zaklyuchenie_IGPRAN_na_roekt_fz_o_policii.pdf>), 
Regional Coalition of NGOs “Agora” (http://old.novayagazeta.
ru/file/pdf/zaklMVD.pdf>), Ural State Law Academy (www.
gfurfo.tmweb.ru/wp-content/uploads/2010/…/nauchno-pravo 
voe.doc>), and Working group of NGOs (<http://www.polit.
ru/article/2010/08/27/npomvd, http://hro.org/node/8908>).
7 FOM. (2010). Public awareness of the adoption of the federal 
law “About the Police”. Retrieved 06/17/2011, from <www.fom.
ru>. Levada Center. (2010). “Public opinion about adoption of 
the new federal law ‘About Police.’ How drastic is the impact 
supposed to be?” Retrieved 06/17/2011, from <www.levada.ru>. 
ROMIR. (2011). “Public awareness about adoption of the new 
federal law ‘About Police.’” Retrieved 06/17/2011, from <www.
romir.ru>
was not fully successful and pledged to continue with 
additional changes. One of Kolokol'tsev’s early initia-
tives was to hold upper-level police officers personally 
responsible for crimes committed by their subordinates.8
Also, in 2012 Russia’s leaders set up an independent 
unit within the Investigative Committee (“Sledstvennyi 
komitet”) to investigate all crimes committed by police 
officers. Previously, such crimes had been investigated 
by numerous agencies, including both the Investigative 
Committee and the Prosecutor’s office. Their efforts were 
often uncoordinated and the agencies lacked sufficient 
resources to be effective.9
That same year, Kolokol'tsev formed a Working 
Group that included the MVD Public Council to 
develop a “road map” outlining future changes for the 
Russian police. In spring 2013, the Working Group pre-
sented a document of over 100 pages describing the fail-
ures of the 2011 reform and proposing new changes. The 
document received mixed reviews from expert observ-
ers, but as of 2014, it is unclear whether any of the pro-
posed measures will be implemented in the near future.
At the beginning of 2014, the federal government 
published a new police budget program, allocating over 
255 billion dollars for the Russian police in 2014–2020.10 
Critics point out that the MVD continues to use similar 
performance indicators despite its pledge to restructure 
the police assessment and reporting system. The federal 
program on the police budget promises to reduce the 
number of registered crimes, increase the criminal case 
clearance rates, and improve the public levels of trust and 
satisfaction in return for the increased federal funding.
In May 2014, Minister Kolokol'tsev introduced a 
major change in the police structure by eliminating 
the Main MVD departments at the federal district 
level (glavnye upravlenia v federalnykh okrugakh). From 
their conception in 2000 until their abolishment, these 
departments served as intermediate levels of law enforce-
ment management to coordinate police work in several 
regions. Putin likely created the federal districts and 
their corresponding police departments to weaken the 
regional authorities and strengthen police centraliza-
tion. Since the 2011 police reform centralized all police 
units under the federal budget, the federal district police 
departments were apparently no longer needed.
8 An interview with Minister Kolokol'tsev of 13 November 2012. 
Retrieved from <http://kommersant.ru/doc/2065561>. Also see 
the article “MVD is preparing the revolution of their cadres” at 
<http://izvestia.ru/news/540803>
9 See the article by Taubina at <http://publicverdict.ru/topics/
library/10193.html>
10 See, for example, <http://www.vedomosti.ru/opinion/news/212 
61431/palochnaya-programma>
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Finally, Minister Kolokol'tsev has pushed to rein-
troduce the institute of public volunteers (druzhinniki), 
which had been eliminated in the 1990s.11 According 
to a new draft law, the volunteers will assist the police 
in patrolling the streets and “working with potential 
victims”, while being compensated for their time from 
local budgets.
The Consequences of the 2011–2014 Police 
Reforms
Most experts agree that Medvedev’s 2011 police reforms 
and subsequent changes implemented by Minister 
Kolokol'tsev will have little or no effect on the Russian 
police’s ability to perform effectively and fight corrup-
tion within its ranks. However, this does not mean that 
the Russian government police reform initiatives have 
no consequences.
One of the major achievements of the 2011–2014 
police reform for the Russian government was the abil-
ity to say that at least something was done to solve the 
issue of “bad police” and move concerns over policing 
outside the mainstream public agenda. In 2009–2010, 
following the disaster when drunken chief police officer 
Denis Evsyukov went on a shooting spree in a Moscow 
supermarket, killing two and wounding seven, and the 
unprecedented whistleblowing by Alexey Dymovsky, a 
police officer who described police corruption on You-
tube and was subsequently fired, public attention in 
Russia focused on the police and every media outlet 
discussed the urgent need for change. Following the 
2011 reforms and the dismissal of the unpopular Min-
ister Rashid Nurgaliev, public attention now is slowly 
moving away from the acute issue of police inefficiency, 
corruption and brutality. In 2014, police reform is no 
longer a popular item on the Russian public agenda. 
In fact, the rare calls from experts to continue police 
reform are no longer welcomed by the public as many 
now feel “reform fatigue.”12
Another important consequence of the recent police 
reforms in Russia is an increase in the levels of job satis-
faction among police officers. Even though many police 
officers were unhappy about the abrupt reform, “re-cer-
tification,” and the extent of public attention created 
by reform, it appears that at least some satisfaction was 
brought by the fact that the government “finally remem-
bered about rank-and-file police officers” and they no 
longer feel “abandoned.” Complaints of neglect among 
police officers were clearly pronounced during the 1990s, 
when the rapid transition to the new political and eco-
11 See, for example, <http://www.openpolice.ru/news/druzhinn 
iki-vmesto-policii/>
12 See, for example, <http://www.kp.ru/daily/26157.5/3045226/>
nomic systems left the police underfunded, understaffed 
and struggling with its new identity. During the 2000s, 
when Russian society was slowly recovering from the 
abrupt post-Soviet transformation, many police officers 
continued to feel abandoned since government fund-
ing of lower rank police officers remained inadequate 
and police legislation was outdated. The 2011 reform, 
with all its imperfections, created at least an impression 
among the rank-and-file officers that the Russian gov-
ernment was taking care of them.13
At the same time, the 2011 police reform also high-
lighted several important problems. One of the major 
issues is the Russian government’s lack of a coherent plan 
to reform the police force. The recent changes intro-
duced in 2011–2014 appear to be sporadic and often 
contradictory to the stated goals of reform. Despite the 
declared need to reduce the numbers of managerial per-
sonnel within the MVD, it appears that the number of 
administrators continues to grow as many high ranked 
police officers are simply reshuffled to lower level MVD 
divisions.14 The law enforcement practices that were pre-
viously abandoned as ineffective (police volunteers) are 
now being re-introduced again, and the institutions that 
were claimed to be an improvement (federal district level 
main departments) are now abandoned as unnecessary. 
It seems that the current measures to reform the police 
are simply reactive measures aimed at alleviating public 
tension inflamed by various and often short-term issues 
with crime and law enforcement practices within Russia.
The public discussion preceding the police reform 
also showed a deep division among different segments 
of Russian society over the role and function of the 
police. Many expert opinions on police reform were 
directly contradictory to each other, calling for either 
further centralization or full decentralization of the 
police hierarchy. There was also no consensus among 
experts and members of civil society on whether the 
functions and authority of the Russian police should be 
further expanded or curtailed under the new law. Pop-
ular opinion surveys preceding the reform indicated 
that many Russians were either undecided or simply 
unclear about what needs to be done to make Russian 
police work better. Many Russians just wanted better 
and less corrupt law enforcement and they expected the 
government to find ways to deliver these public goods. 
Such contradictory views held by members of Russian 
civil society and often paternalistic and ignorant pub-
13 See, for example, discussion boards of police officers at <http://
www.prof-police.ru/> and <http://www.policemagazine.ru/>
14 See, for example, <http://www.openpolice.ru/news/kak-sokrash 
enie-shtabnogo-apparata-mvd-privedet-k-ego-novomu-rostu/>
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lic views are serious obstacles for future reforms of Rus-
sian law enforcement.
Under these circumstances, it is unclear when and 
how the Russian police will be “reformed” again, and 
whether it will be done one more time under the pres-
sure of a new public crisis or will be an effort to truly 
change the nature of the police driven by the matura-
tion of Russian civil society. It is unlikely that any fur-
ther drastic changes in the law enforcement institutions 
of Russia will be implemented without political changes, 
which at the moment seems doubtful. At this point, it is 
more likely that in the near future Russian police per-
formance will improve marginally with a continuous 
increase in federal funding, the streamlining of some 
police functionality, and MVD re-structuring.
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ANALYSIS
The Day-to-Day Work of the Russian Police
By Lauren A. McCarthy, Amherst, Massachusetts
Abstract
The Russian public has a dim view of its police. The strict hierarchy of the police ranks and the assessment 
system used to measure their job performance help to explain why the police do things that limit their abil-
ity to conduct criminal investigations and develop strong day-to-day relations with residents on their beats. 
Addressing these issues will provide the base for more effective police reform than Russia has seen so far.
A Matter of incentives
The Russian police have struggled to gain legitimacy 
with the public in the post-Soviet period. Poll num-
bers frequently show that a majority of people distrust 
the police and consider them corrupt and ineffective. 
However, in a December 2011 survey, my colleagues 
and I found that only 27% of Russians reported some 
sort of encounter with the police in the past two years. 
Other surveys have shown similar results. Most peo-
ple get information about the police not from personal 
contact, but from the media or from second- or third-
hand stories told by friends and family. Here I suggest 
that one of the important causes of negative perceptions 
of the police is the gap between what people think that 
the police should be doing and what their incentives 
actually push them to do. This brief article focuses on 
two critically important institutional aspects of polic-
ing in Russia—the structure of hierarchical subordina-
tion and the quantitatively-based performance assess-
ment system—to show how Russian police navigate and 
weigh competing demands on their time and resources. 
Ultimately, the typical Russian police officer subordi-
nates the demands of the public to the demands of his 
institution, not because he is lazy, corrupt or does not 
care, but because not responding to institutional incen-
tives has a far greater impact on his opportunities for 
career advancement and his take-home pay. Below, I 
illustrate how these incentives play out in two areas of 
policing, criminal investigations and day-to-day polic-
ing by beat officers.
Before discussing police incentives, it is worth dis-
aggregating who the “police” actually are. As of 2012, 
the police agency’s Ministry of the Interior (Minis-
terstvo Vnutrennykh Del'—MVD) oversees a national 
police force of over one million employees with the 
majority of those working on the ground in direct con-
tact with citizens. The MVD is a hierarchical struc-
ture divided into specialized sub-units which are repli-
cated at the national, federal district (okrug), regional 
(sub''ekt) and local (raion) levels. These sub-units each 
fulfill specific law enforcement functions and include 
among others, traffic policing, beat policing, criminal 
investigation and prevention of corruption and extrem-
ism. Most police work takes place at the local level in 
cities and towns. Throughout Russia, there are approx-
imately 2,000 local departments (upravlenie), each with 
about 100–150 employees covering 50,000–100,000 
residents. The public is most likely to encounter only a 
few of these specialized sub-units, primarily the police 
assigned to their beat (uchastkovyi) and if they drive, the 
